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While the direct impact of geographic endowments on prosperity is present in all countries,
in former colonies, geography has also aﬀected colonization policies and, therefore, institutional
outcomes. Using non-colonized countries as a control group, I develop an empirical strategy
that disentangles the partial eﬀects of institutions and of endowments on income. I ﬁnd that
institutions are the main determinant of development, but that endowments have a sizeable
direct impact, as well. Last, I apply the empirical strategy to examine the theories put forward
by La Porta et al. (1999) and by Acemoglu et al. (2001), ﬁnding support for both theories,
but also evidence that the authors’ estimates are biased since they mix up the eﬀect of the
historical determinants of institutions with the sizeable direct impact of access to trade and
of disease environment.
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1Is the large inequality in the wealth of nations a result of man-made history or, rather, the
inevitable consequence of nature?
Two rivaling schools of thought emphasize either geographic endowments or institutions as
the main determinant of comparative development. The "endowments" view, developed among
others by Diamond (1997), Bloom and Sachs (1998), Gallup et al. (1998), and Frankel and Romer
(1999), argues that climate, the quality of soil, location, and other geographic features directly
impact the prevalence of disease, the productivity of labor, and prosperity.
In contrast, the "institutions" view, pioneered in its modern form by North (1981), argues
that the organization of society is the basic force of comparative development. This hypothesis
has received strong support from the empirical work of Mauro (1995), La Porta et al. (1997, 1998,
and 1999), Hall and Jones (1999), Acemoglu et al. (2001 and 2002), and Feyrer and Sacerdote
(2008). These authors instrument for the endogenous quality of institutions with the institutions
induced by the course of history.
Although it is fair to say that the literature arguing for the importance of institutions is
currently the dominant view of development,1 it is not free from criticism. A major concern is that
the instrumental variables used to establish the eﬀect of institutions were aﬀected by endowments
and early economic development, and that the instrumentation strategies are, therefore, invalid.
For example, the correlation between disease environment and income per capita can be attributed
to either the indirect eﬀect of settler mortality rates on colonization policies in accordance with
the theory of Acemoglu et al. (2001), or to the direct impact of disease on income. Similarly,
the regularity that legal systems based on British common law are generally associated with
higher income than systems based on civil law could reﬂect the causal impact of the legal system
on economic performance, but it could also reﬂect the fact that the British tended to colonize
countries with more favorable endowments.2
This study contributes to the understanding of the partial eﬀects of institutions and of en-
1Af r e q u e n tﬁnding of this literature is that, once the quality of institutions is accounted for, endowments matter
only marginally for development. See also Easterly and Levine (2003) and Rodrik et al. (2004).
2As I argue below, adding controls for the potential direct eﬀect of endowments to the empirical estimations
does not alleviate this concern since also these controls potentially aﬀect development both directly and indirectly
via colonization policies. What is missing in the current literature is a clear control group that distinguishes the
direct eﬀect of endowments from the impact of colonization policies. I set out to build such a control group below.
2dowments for comparative development. The key insight is that one can utilize the interaction of
colonial history and geography to identify the partial eﬀects of institutions and endowments. In
countries that have been colonized, geographic location has aﬀected the identity of the colonizer
and thus the nation’s legal origin. In these nations, disease environment and the resulting mortal-
ity rates of European settlers have determined the way in which a country was colonized. These
indirect eﬀects of endowments on colonization policies were only present in former colonies. In
contrast, the direct impact of endowments on development is present also in countries that have
not been colonized (non-colonies).
Since endowments had both a direct as well as an indirect eﬀect on colonization policies in
the group of former colonies, but shaped development only directly in the group of non-colonies,
the diﬀerence in how geography has aﬀected economic outcomes in these two groups can identify
the determinants of development. In this respect, the current studies formalizes the hypotheses of
Engerman and Sokoloﬀ (1997) and Acemoglu et al. (2002), who argue that the eﬀect of geography
on economic development was reversed during colonization: endowments that were favorable for
development early on lead later to unfavorable colonization policies.3
The analysis of this paper proceeds in three steps. In the ﬁrst step, I document that while
geography and the instrumental variables used in the current literature to identify the causal
eﬀect of institutions are highly collinear, geography itself had a diﬀerent eﬀect on development in
former colonies and in the rest of the world. I then show how the partial eﬀects of endowments
and institutions on income can be disentangled.
In the two-stage least square estimations developed below, the identifying assumption is that
the diﬀerence in how endowments have shaped development in former colonies and in the rest of
the world is the result of the institutions brought about by colonization. In contrast to the existing
literature on institutions, this identiﬁcation does not restrict the common eﬀect of endowments on
prosperity to be absent. It therefore allows testing whether endowments do have a direct impact
on development.4
3This basic insight is also related to the work of Nunn and Puga (2008), who demonstrate that the slave trade
has reversed the impact of internal transportation cost due to the protection from slave traders that rugged terrain
provided.
4In the analysis below, I document that although colonization is likely endogenous, the interaction coeﬃcients
that are utilized to identify the determinants of development are not aﬀected by this potential endogeneity.
3In the second step of the analysis, I present estimates of the partial eﬀects of institutions
and endowments on economic development. Both forces are shown to be statistically signiﬁ-
cant and economically relevant. In a baseline estimation, a one standard-deviation diﬀerence in
endowments is associated with a direct impact on prosperity equivalent to a roughly eight-fold
diﬀerence in income per capita. In former colonies, the same one standard-deviation diﬀerence
in geographic endowments had an additional eﬀect on colonization policies and institutional out-
comes that amounts to a roughly 34−fold diﬀerence in income per capita. The point estimate
for the importance of institutions for income implies that a one standard-deviation diﬀerence in
institutional quality is associated with a roughly seven-fold diﬀerence in income per capita.5
In the third step of the analysis, to relate the ﬁndings of this study to the existing literature, I
examine the theories of Acemoglu et al. (2001) and La Porta et al. (1999) using the methodology
of this paper. I ﬁrst highlight the role of disease on development throughout history. To that
end, I construct a measure of the geographic potential for disease, i.e., the level of germs that
would prevail if a country was untouched by Western civilization. For a former colony, a 1%
higher level of potential for disease is associated with a roughly 1.2% lower level of income per
capita. In a baseline estimation of this paper, around three fourths of the total eﬀect of disease is
attributed to the institution-building channel, i.e., to the impact that settler mortality rates had
on colonization policies and institutions, hence conﬁrming the theory of Acemoglu et al. (2001).
The remaining quarter is, however, attributed to the direct impact of disease on development.
I next examine the importance of legal origin for institutional outcomes taking into account
that location and transportation costs could have mattered for colonizer identity and, conse-
quently, for legal origin. Indeed, I document that the location of former colonies can very well
predict legal origin. Controlling for this relation, I ﬁnd that the causal eﬀect of adopting a com-
mon law system is larger than what the estimations of La Porta et al. suggest. The reason for this
is the following. Countries with a location such that they where likely to be colonized by Britain
are, on average, remote from export markets, which is detrimental to growth. Consequently,
5The instrumentation strategy relies on the interaction of endowments and a colony dummy. Consequently, the
instrument varies only within the group of former colonies. These numbers, as well as the results presented below,
thus measure the importance of institutions in the group of former colonies, but not necessarily in the rest of the
sample.
4t h ep o s i t i v ee ﬀect of adopting a British legal system is partly obscured by the negative eﬀect of
remoteness.
Overall, this leads me to conclude that both the direct and the indirect institution-building
eﬀect of various geographic endowments matter for development. This fact reconciles the con-
trasting ﬁndings of the two rivaling literatures. In the studies arguing for the importance of
institutions, identifying the relation between institutions and income attributes all of the corre-
lation between endowments and income to the impact of institutions. Similarly, the literature
arguing for the importance of geography attributes all of this correlation to the direct impact of
endowments. Since both channels matter, existing studies are biased in favor of their starting
hypothesis.
The structure of this paper is the following. Section 1 discusses the existing literature. Section
2 documents how the two forces of development can be distinguished and Section 3 sets up the
econometric framework. Section 4 presents the results using geographic variables directly. Section
5 examines the role of disease environment. Section 6 examines the role of location and legal origin
for development and Section 7 concludes.
1 Two Theories, But One Correlation?
It goes without saying that throughout history, the development of human culture has been
strongly inﬂuenced by geography. For example, Diamond’s (1997) seminal theory of development
is so convincing because it is self-evident that hunters could only evolve into farmers in places
where nature oﬀered plants of suﬃcient nutritional value. Similarly, the eﬃcient use of the plow
— and thus the incentives to invent it — hinges on the incidence of large mammals, thus explaining
why this technology never reached widespread use in Australia, where large mammals where
extinct shortly after humans arrived.
A question of much more policy relevance, however, is to what extent endowments continue to
aﬀect economic development today. Much of the current literature is focused on identifying the
impact of disease. Since unhealthy people are less productive and shorter life expectancy reduces
investment in human capital, the strong correlation between the prevalence of disease and income
5levels is not surprising. For example, Gallup and Sachs (2001) estimate that the growth of
income per capita is 1.3 percentage points lower in countries with high prevalence of malaria. To
demonstrate that this correlation is causal, Sachs (2003) instruments for the prevalence of the
disease with the natural incidence of mosquito vectors that are more prone to carry the parasite
and with climate conditions, conﬁrming that widespread prevalence of malaria is associated with
substantial economic costs.
A second major channel through which endowments aﬀect development today are transporta-
tion costs. Modern economies grow via the accumulation of technology and recouping the costs of
innovation requires access to a large market. In their ingenious study, Frankel and Romer (1999)
document that some countries are virtually in a much better position than others to reap the ben-
eﬁts of globalization since they are located close to big export markets. To estimate the causal
eﬀect of trade on growth they ﬁrst construct estimates of a country’s geographic potential for
trade. They then instrument for actual trade ﬂows with the constructed measure and document
that better access to trade is associated with a substantial eﬀect on income.
In addition to disease and transportation costs, endowments aﬀect development through many
additional channels. For example, soil quality still greatly impact agricultural yields. Dell et al.
(2008) document that variation in climate has large growth eﬀects in developing nations. Overall,
Bloom and Sachs (1998) estimate that around two-thirds of Africa’s miserable growth record over
the last two centuries can be attributed to the eﬀect of adverse endowments, and only one third
to economic policy and institutions.
This result stands in strong contrast to ﬁndings of a large body of literature establishing that
institutional performance, such as the rule of the law or the protection from expropriation, is the
strongly correlated with income. To determine whether this correlation is causal, many studies
instrument for the endogenous quality of institutions with the institutions brought forward by a
nation’s colonization experience. For example, La Porta et al. (1997, 1998, and 1999) propose
dummies origin of the legal system as an instrument for institutional outcomes. They argue
that owing to their fundamentally diﬀerent legal systems, diﬀerent colonizers such as France
and Britain installed diﬀerent institutions in the countries they colonized, with very diﬀerent
associated economic outcomes.
6Acemoglu et al. (2001 and 2002) focus on how diﬀerent local conditions in the colonies shaped
institutional outcomes. Acemoglu et al. (2001) argue that in places unfavorable to European
physiology, the main objective of the colonizers was to extract resources by corrupting local
institutions. In contrast, when chances of survival where high, European settlers came in large
numbers and the focus of the colonizers was to produce rather than to extract, leading them to
install institutions geared towards ensuring good property rights. Acemoglu et al. (2002), in turn,
argue that colonizers were more likely to install extractive institutions in initially rich and densely
populated areas. Last, Feyrer and Sacerdote (2008) instrument for the timing and duration of
colonization of islands with wind direction and speed.
These articles and the large literature deriving from them hold in common the following set
of three underlying assumptions.
1. Colonization policies were inﬂuenced by colonizer identity or local conditions prevailing in
the colonies.
2. Diﬀerent colonization policies created diﬀerences in early institutional arrangements that
persist until today.
3. Colonization policies were not aﬀected by country characteristics that directly inﬂuence
prosperity.
The current literature centers on establishing the validity of the ﬁrst two assumptions. This
paper examines the remaining one. As has been emphasized in particular by Dollar and Kray
(2003), the instrumental variables of the current literature are highly collinear with geographic
variables (see also the four rightmost Columns of Table 1). The mere collinearity between endow-
ments and the proposed instruments for institutions, however, does not necessarily invalidate the
results of the current literature, since it is possible to control for the eﬀect of endowments.
The fundamental problem of the current literature is that geographic endowments impact
development directly, but they have also indirectly mattered for development through their impact
on colonization policies in the past.
Can we attribute the correlation between the prevalence of malaria and of income to the
7direct impact of the disease, or alternatively to the indirect impact of settler mortality rates?6
Pre-colonial income levels where heavily inﬂuenced by the quality of soil and a country’s climate.
Is the relation between these measures and income per capita the direct result of how geography
aﬀects the productivity of the agricultural sector, or is it reﬂecting the past impact of geography
on pre-colonial income levels and colonization policies? As I document below, the location of
former colonies had a strong impact on the origin of the country’s colonizer and thus the origin
of its legal system. Can one attribute the relation between the geographic potential for trade
and income to the direct impact of access to trade, or to the indirect eﬀect of legal origin on
institutional outcomes?
In sum, endowments have shaped colonization policies through multiple channels, but they also
directly impact prosperity. Is the correlation between geographic features and economic outcomes
a consequence of the direct impact of endowments on development, or rather, the indirect result
of how colonization policies were aﬀected by endowments?
2 Distinguishing the Theories
In this paper, I argue that the comparison of how endowments have shaped economic development
in the group of former colonies and in the rest of the world can distinguish between the rivaling
literatures. The methodology of this paper is best exempliﬁed for the theory of Acemoglu et al.
(2001). The endowments view predicts a direct correlation of disease and development that is
common to all countries. The theory of Acemoglu et al. (2001) predicts a correlation of disease
environment and institutional outcomes that is exclusively present in the group of former colonies.
Since disease aﬀected both colonization policies and development directly in former colonies, but
only had one of these two eﬀects in non-colonies, the diﬀerence in how disease environment
mattered for development between these two groups is the exclusive result of colonization policies
and can be utilized to estimate the partial eﬀects of development.
More generally, the eﬀect of any endowment on colonization policies was only present in former
6In particular, Acemoglu et al. (2003), argue that most important channel through which the disease has aﬀected
development is via its historical impact on the formation of institutions, while Sachs (2003) arrives at the opposite
conclusion although he is using the same data.
8colonies. The direct eﬀect of the same variable is present in all countries. Thus, while the eﬀects
of endowments and colonization policies are observationally equivalent in a sample of former
colonies, they can be disentangled in a larger sample that also includes non-colonized countries by
using the fact that the eﬀect of the same variable was diﬀerent across the two groups of countries.
A graphical inspection is expedient to examine how distinct the impact of geography on
colonization policies and, therefore, institutional outcomes was. In Figure 1 to 3, and in the
main part of the text, a country is counted as a former colony if it ever has either been an
oﬃcially colonized, was under the control of an empire-aﬃliated organization such as the Dutch
and British East Indies Companies, had the status of protectorate of a non-adjacent empire, or
lost the sovereignty over its foreign policy following a military conﬂict with a non-adjacent empire.
With this deﬁnition, 56 countries are classiﬁed as non-colonized nations, while 95 are classiﬁed as
former colonies.7
Did geography indeed inﬂuence colonization policies and if so, through which mechanisms?
The upper scatter plot of Figure 1 relates a country’s average rainfall to its score for the rule
of law in the group of colonies. The lower plot presents the same relation for the rest of the
sample. While there is a strong negative association between these two variables in colonies, they
are essentially uncorrelated in the group of non-colonies. As I demonstrate in Section 5 below,
the negative eﬀect of higher rainfall on colonization policies stems from the positive relation of
rainfall and settler mortality rates.
Colonization also inﬂuenced how a country’s development depends on its access to trade.
Both scatter plots of Figure 2 relate a country’s distance from Europe to its score for the rule of
law. Since countries that are close to Europe tend to be close to many export markets, they have
easier access to trade and should be economically more developed. Indeed, I conﬁrm this ﬁnding of
Frankel and Romer (1999) in the group of non-colonies, where higher access to trade is associated
with better outcomes for the rule of law. However, the impact of trade access has been reversed
in former colonies, where more remote colonies are characterized by better institutional outcomes
(see upper scatter plot). Section 6 documents that the reversal of how remoteness mattered for
7None of the results in this paper are dependent on using this precise deﬁnition of the colony dummy. Table 9
in Appendix B examines alternative deﬁnitions.
9development stems from the fact that Britain was more likely to colonize remote nations than
were France or Spain.
Last, Figure 3 documents that colonization also has partly reversed the eﬀect of elevation on
development. Owing to higher internal transportation costs in more elevated areas, the relation
between institutions and elevation is negative in non-colonies. However, this negative relation is
much milder in the group of former colonies, a pattern that could be rationalized by elevated areas
being harder to control for the colonizers, thus limiting the detrimental impact of colonization
policies.
Table 2 analyzes whether the patterns uncovered in Figures 1 to 3 are statistically signiﬁcant
and extends the analysis to alternative measures of endowments. In all regressions, the dependent
v a r i a b l ei st h ea v e r a g es c o r ef o rt h er u l eo fl a w .C o n s i d e rﬁrst the OLS speciﬁcations in Panel A.
In the ﬁrst two estimations, the independent variable is the logarithm of average rainfall. The
sample consists of former colonies in Column 1 and of countries that have not been colonized
in Column 2. While higher rainfall is associated with signiﬁcantly worse institutional outcomes
in the group of colonies, this is not the case in the rest of the world. To investigate whether
this diﬀerence in the eﬀe c to fr a i n f a l li ss i g n i ﬁcant, the next column adds a dummy equal to
one for former colonies and the interaction of this dummy with average rainfall. The interaction
coeﬃcient is equal to the diﬀerence in the eﬀect of rainfall in Columns 1 and 2. It is signiﬁcant
and negative, thus conﬁrming that rainfall had a diﬀerent impact on institutional development
between former colonies and the rest of the world.
A potential concern with the OLS speciﬁcation of Panel A could be that the interaction coef-
ﬁcient is inﬂuenced by a latent nonlinear relation between rainfall and economic outcomes. For
example, while more rainfall is good for economic outcomes in dry climate, more rainfall might
be detrimental for growth in an already wet climate. Since colonies are, on average, character-
ized by a higher level of rainfall than are non-colonies (see Table 1), the negative interaction in
Column 3 could, consequently, be the result of a non-linear main eﬀect of rainfall, rather than
the consequence of colonization. To address this concern, in Panel B, I report the results from a
semi-parametric estimation allowing for a nonlinear main eﬀect of rainfall. This model estimates
an equation of the form Rulei = F(Rainfalli)+λR ∗ Ci + θR ∗ Ci ∗ Rainfalli + νi,w h e r eCi is
10a dummy equal to one if i is a former colony, F(...) is an unknown function, and the interaction
eﬀect θR is restricted to be linear. Panel B reports the coeﬃcient and standard error for the inter-
action coeﬃcient. For the main eﬀect of rainfall, the p-value corresponding to the null hypothesis
that F(...)=0is reported. The nonlinear main eﬀect of rainfall is not signiﬁcant and accounting
for a potential nonlinearity does not inﬂuence the estimated interaction coeﬃcient substantially.
Colonization has reversed the impact of rainfall on institutional outcomes. Column 4 examines
whether the same is true for distance from Europe, termed “market access”. As in Column 3, the
sample includes all countries and the speciﬁcation includes the colony dummy and the interaction
of market access with the colony dummy. Indeed, the pattern unveiled in Figure 2 is statistically
signiﬁcant.
In Column 5, the OLS estimation in Panel A suggests that the also diﬀerence in how elevation
aﬀected the rule of law is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent between former colonies and the rest of the sample.
However, the interaction eﬀect is far from signiﬁcant once a possible nonlinearity is accounted
for in Panel B. Closer inspection of the data reveals that the positive least-squares interaction
coeﬃcient is driven by a less-than-linear main eﬀect of elevation on the rule of law and the fact
that a few non-colonies such as Bhutan are very elevated.
Columns 6 and 7 document that colonization has also reversed the eﬀect of average tempera-
ture and humidity. In the OLS estimation of Column 6, the main eﬀect of average temperature is
estimated around zero, while the interaction coeﬃcient is signiﬁcant and negative. Similarly, in
Column 7, the main eﬀect of humidity is positive, while the interaction coeﬃcient is negative. In
the two latter speciﬁcations, a possible nonlinear main eﬀect in the semi-parametric estimation
of Panel B is nto signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
Column 8 includes Malaria Ecology from Kiszewski et al. (2004), which measures the geo-
graphic potential for malaria. Higher levels of malaria are associated with lower scores for the
rule of law in all countries, but the eﬀect is more pronounced in former colonies. However, neither
of the two coeﬃcients is signiﬁcant in either the OLS or the semi-parametric estimation.8
8It should be noted that the only non-colony with a high potential for malaria is Thailand, an economy with a
relatively high score for the rule of law. Thus, the covariance of malaria ecology and the rule of law within the group
of non-colonies - and, therefore, both the main and the interaction coeﬃcient - is very sensitive to the inclusion of
Thailand.
11Since it is a good proxy for many aspects of climate, the distance from the equator has often
been used as summary measure of geographic endowments. In Column 9, I examine whether
also this variable has aﬀected development diﬀerently in the diﬀerent groups of countries. In
the OLS estimation, the main eﬀect is signiﬁcant, while the interaction coeﬃcient is small and
insigniﬁcant. However, in the semi-parametric estimation, both the direct and the indirect eﬀect
of latitude are signiﬁcant and the interaction coeﬃcient is economically sizeable. For example,
a one standard-deviation diﬀerence in latitude (16.8) is associated with an institution-building
eﬀect during colonization that amounts to a change in the rule of law of 1.34 points, a diﬀerence
roughly equal to that between Australia and Argentina.
3E c o n o m e t r i c F r a m e w o r k
A wide set of geographic variables had a markedly diﬀerent eﬀect on development in former
colonies and the rest of the world, a pattern that can be utilized to identify the partial eﬀects of
institutions and endowments. Throughout the analysis, let Yi denote the logarithm of GDP per
capita and Ri the measure of institutional quality in country i. Denote geographic endowments
by Ei and the measure summarizing European colonization policies by Pi. Last, the dummy Ci
equals 1 for former colonies and 0 otherwise. Abstracting from covariates, the joint model of
colonization, institutions, and income is given by:
Yi = e λY + e λ
0
Y Ci + e αRi + e ηY Ei + e νY,i (1)
Ri = e λR + e λ
0
RCi + e ηREi + e βYi + Cie θRPi + e νR,i (2)
Pi = e λP +e θPEi + e νP,i (3)
where (3) applies only to former colonies.
A country’s institutions and income level depend on endowments through three potential chan-
nels. First, endowments may directly aﬀect technology and income, measured by e ηY in Equation
(1). Second, the analysis allows for a potential direct eﬀect of endowments on institutions, mea-
sured by e ηR in Equation (2). The latter channel accounts for the possibility that the organization
12of society and the quality of institutions depends directly on climate, disease, and other en-
dowments. For example, terrain ruggedness may aﬀect the fractionalization of the population
along ethnic lines, thereby inﬂuencing the accountability of the local political elite, which also
aﬀects postcolonial institutions (see Gennaioli and Rainer (2007)). Third, the theories relating
institutional origin to colonial experience predict that endowments aﬀected colonization policies
and institutional outcomes in former colonies, measured by e θP in Equation (3).
With these three distinct eﬀects in mind, consider an estimation of the reduced form of Equa-
tion (1), (2), and (3) in a sample composed of former colonies such that Ci =1for all observations.
In an instrumental variable estimation using this sample, the ﬁrst-stage coeﬃcient of endowments
could be signiﬁcant either because colonization policies were aﬀected by endowments (e θPe θR), be-
cause endowments have a direct eﬀect on institutions (e ηR), or because endowments directly impact
income, which in turn aﬀects institutions (e βe ηY ). In the second-stage estimation of Equation (1),
the eﬀect of institutions on income could be overstated because the restriction that endowments
do not directly aﬀect development (e ηY =0 ) is needed to identify the system. Due to this re-
striction, all of the correlation between endowments and income is attributed to the institutional
channel and the coeﬃcient of instrumented institutional quality in (1) is biased if geography also
has a direct eﬀect on income.
In contrast, consider an estimation of the reduced form of Equations (1), (2), and (3) in a
sample that also includes non-colonized nations.9
Yi = λY + λ0
Y Ci + α
− →
Ri + ηY Ei + νY,i (4)
− →
Ri = λR + λ0
RCi + ηREi + θR (EiCi)+νR,i (5)
Where
− →
Ri is the ﬁrst-stage projection of Ri.T h e ﬁrst-stage estimation of the reduced-form
model in Equation (5) includes the main eﬀect of endowments, a colony dummy, as well as the
interaction of these two variables. Since the additional variation in the group of non-colonized
countries determines the coeﬃcient for the direct impact of endowments on income (ηY ), the
9When comparing the coeﬃcients in Equations (1), (2), and (3) to the ones in (5) and (4), θR = h θRh θP/









1 − h αh β

, demonstrating that there may be heterscedasticity between the two groups
of countries. All results presented below are thus estimated with heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors.
13estimation can disentangle the true relation between institutions and income. ηR captures the
direct eﬀect that geography has on institutional development, while θR captures the institution-
building eﬀect of endowments during colonizations.
It is noteworthy that the identiﬁcation does not assume that colonization is orthogonal to
either income or institutions. If colonization is correlated with e νY,i or e νR,i, the colony dummies
λ0
Y and λ0
R are biased, but the other coeﬃcients are not aﬀected.
Remark 1 Assume that
e νR,i = γRCi +e  R,i and e νY,i = γY Ci +e  Y,i ,
where, by construction, e  R,i,e  Y,i ⊥ Ci. Denote the expectation of the two-stage least square point









¯ ¯γR6=0 or γY 6=0 = E
h
b θR
i¯ ¯γR=0 and γY =0 = θR
E [b a]
¯ ¯ ¯γR6=0 or γY 6=0 = E [b a]
¯ ¯γR=0 and γY =0
Proposition 1 Proof. see Appendix A
Remark 1 is intuitive. Since the presence of the colony dummy in both stages eliminates
all across-group variation and co-variation, the coeﬃcients of interest, b θR and b a,d e p e n do n
within-group variances and covariances only. Although the endogeneity of colonization aﬀects
across-group diﬀerences, it has no eﬀect on the within-group diﬀerences. Consequently, the point
estimates that depend only on within-group variation are not aﬀected by the endogeneity of
colonization.
A note of caution, however, is in order regarding the comparability of former colonies and the
rest of the world and, therefore, on the generality of the results presented below. The analysis of
this study is based on the premise that the direct eﬀects of geographic endowments on prosperity
are equal across all countries. Nevertheless, the analysis does not assume that the eﬀect of
institutions on income is the same across these two groups of countries. The employed instrument
utilizes the interaction of endowments and the colony dummy. It consequently varies only within
14the group of former colonies. The estimation results presented below thus measure the eﬀect
of institutions on income in the group of former colonies, but not necessarily in the rest of the
sample.
4T h e P a r t i a l E ﬀects of Endowments and Institutions
In e x te s t i m a t et h ep a r t i a le ﬀects of institutions and endowments. Of the geographic variables
examined in Table 2, I exclude elevation and latitude since the non-parametric estimation indi-
cates that the interaction coeﬃcients could be biased due to a latent nonlinear direct eﬀect of
endowments on economic outcomes. I also exclude malaria ecology since the variable varies only
very little in the group of former colonies and the results become very sensitive to the in- or ex-
clusion of Thailand when this variable is added to the estimation. The four remaining geographic
variables are rainfall, temperature, humidity, and remoteness.
Panel A of Table 3 displays the ﬁrst-stage estimation relating geography and colonization
experience to institutional quality. Panel B displays the second-stage estimation relating endow-
ments and instrumented institutional quality to income. In Panel A, the dependent variable is
the 1996 to 2004 average of the score for the rule of law. In Panel B, the dependent variable is
the logarithm 2003 GDP per capita estimate from the Worldbank Development Indicators.
Columns 1 to 3 highlight the methodology of this paper. In all three models, the independent
variable is humidity. The ﬁrst two columns display the raw correlation between this variable and
income per capita in Panel B or the rule of law in Panel A. In Column 1, the sample includes
only former colonies, while it includes only non-colonies in Column 2. Column 3 identiﬁes the
relation between institutions and income by utilizing the diﬀerence in how humidity has aﬀected
development in former colonies and in the rest of the world. In the latter estimation, the sample
includes all 151 countries and the ﬁrst-stage estimation adds the interaction of average humidity
and the colony dummy.
The interaction coeﬃcient is signiﬁcant at the 5% level and estimated at -3.67, the diﬀerence
between the ﬁrst-stage coeﬃcients for humidity in Columns 1 and 2. In Column 3, Panel B,
the restriction identifying the relation between institutions and income is that the diﬀerence in
15how humidity has aﬀected development is the exclusive result of the institutions installed during
colonization. The signiﬁcant coeﬃcient of the rule of law is equal to the diﬀerence in how humidity
has aﬀected income per capita divided by the diﬀerence in how humidity aﬀected institutional
outcomes (Up to rounding 1.31 = (−1.44 − 3.38)/(−0.85 − 2.82), i.e., a one standard-deviation
diﬀerence in the rule of law is associated with about a fourfold diﬀerence in income per capita.
Humidity also does have a direct impact on development. Combining ﬁrst- and second stage
eﬀects, a one percentage point more humid climate is associated with a 3.4% higher income per
capita. Colonization, however, reversed the eﬀect of humidity on development. A one percentage
p o i n tm o r eh u m i dc l i m a t ei sa s s o c i a t e dw i t ha ne ﬀect on colonization policies resulting in a 0.0367
point lower score of the rule of law, equivalent to a 4.8% lower income per capita.
Columns 4 to 6 repeat this decomposition for rainfall, temperature, and remoteness from
Europe. The interaction coeﬃcient is signiﬁcant at the 5% level for the case of rainfall and at the
1% level in the other two speciﬁcations. For these three variables, the direct eﬀect of endowments
on income is never signiﬁcant and the direct eﬀect on the rule of law is signiﬁcant only for the
case of remoteness.
I proceed to a joint estimation including all four measures of endowments. Column 7 presents
the OLS relation between these four variables and GDP per capita in Panel B and the score for
the rule of law on Panel A. Column 8 presents the two-stage least-square results. At the bottom
of Table 3, I report two p-values corresponding to the null hypotheses that the included measures
of endowments matter directly for income or for institutions.
Also the joint estimation conﬁrms that colonization has reversed the impact of many endow-
ments. For example, in the OLS estimation, a 1% higher level of rainfall is associated with a 0.33%
lower income per capita. In contrast, the estimation in Column 8 predicts that for a non-colony,
1% more rainfall is associated with a 0.10 higher score for the rule of law and — combining ﬁrst-
and second stage eﬀects — a 0.10% higher income per capita. For a former colony, the additional
institution-building eﬀect amounts to a 0.37 percent lower score for the rule of law, which is
associated with a 0.63% lower income per capita.
Overall, how important is the institution-building channel and how much of the correlation
between income and geography is due to the direct eﬀect of endowments? Consider a one standard-
16deviation (standard deviations are listed in Table 1) change of all four endowments for a non-
colony. In the model of Column 8, such a change (more rainfall, higher temperature and humidity,
and closer to Europe) is associated with a total eﬀect of 2.05 ln-points, or a nearly eightfold
diﬀerence in income per capita. In former colonies, the same diﬀerence in endowments has had an
additional eﬀect equivalent to a 3.5 ln-points diﬀerence in income per capita (34-fold). Thus, the
indirect institution-building eﬀect of endowments during colonization is much more pronounced
than the direct eﬀect.
Owing to the distinct importance of endowments during colonization, institutional outcomes
are estimated to have a large impact on economic outcomes. In the baseline estimation of Column
8, a one standard-deviation diﬀerence in the rule of law is associated with a more than ﬁve-
fold diﬀerence in income per capita, a point estimate in line with the ﬁndings of the existing
literature.10
Table 4 examines the robustness of these ﬁndings with respect to changes in the sample,
addition of further controls, and use of alternative measures of institutional outcomes. The
structure of the table mirrors Table 3 and all estimations include the four regressors from the
baseline estimation in Column 8 of Table 3. Columns 1 to 5 check whether the results presented so
far are driven by the inclusion of speciﬁc groups of countries. Columns 6 to 8 add further controls
to the estimation and Columns 9 to 10 use alternative measures of institutional outcomes.
A ﬁrst concern is that many African former colonies are poor and characterized by adverse
endowments. If African countries are poor for reasons other than colonization, inclusion of this
group could be the sole driver of the presented relations. In Column 1, the sample thus excludes all
47 countries that lie on the African tectonic plate. A second key concern could be that the group of
oil-rich nations — including a number of nations on the Arabian Peninsula with extremely dry and
hot climate — are not representative for the theories of development examined in this study, since
the wealth from oil has overshadowed all other forces of development. The estimation in Column
2 thus excludes 34 nations in which proven oil reserves exceed 50,000 barrels per capita. Third,
10The point estimates for the impact of the rule of law varies somewhat when using alternative geographic variables
in Columns 3 to 6. To examine whether the diﬀerences in this point estimate are signiﬁcant, in the speciﬁcation
of Column 8 that includes all instruments, the heteroscedasticity-robust Hansen J test for overidentiﬁcation (all
instruments) is reported, which cannot be rejected also at the 10% level.
17among the group of former colonies, the “neo-Europes” Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the
USA stand out in that they are rich and endowed with a rather mild climate. The estimation in
Column 3 thus excludes these four "neo-Europes". Fourth, one could argue that former Soviet
countries where in fact not truly independent nations and a similar case could be made for all
former members of the Warsaw Pact. To address this potential concern, the estimation in Column
4 excludes all former members of the Warsaw pact except Russia itself.
In- or exclusion of each of these above-mentioned groups of countries has a very limited
impact on the estimated coeﬃcient of the rule of law, the interaction coeﬃcients in the ﬁrst-
stage estimation, and the direct impact of endowments in the second-stage estimation. The
results may, however, be sensitive to a few other outliers that do not belong to a group that can
easily be identiﬁed. To examine this concern, Column 5 presents a quantile instrumental variable
estimation, which is inﬂuenced by outliers to a much lesser extent than least square estimations.
The estimation results for the 50th quantile are presented. Again, I ﬁnd that institutions are
signiﬁcant determinants of income and the point estimates are in line with the results of the
least-squares estimations.
Rather than changing the composition of the sample, I next add three sets of controls to
the estimation. Both economic outcomes and geographic endowments vary considerably across
the continents, but to a much lesser extent within each continent. Are the results presented so
f a rd r i v e nb ya c r o s s - c o n t i n e n td i ﬀerences, or can endowments and colonial history also explain
diﬀerences within continents? The estimation in Column 6 includes continent dummies for Africa,
Asia, Oceania, and Asia, thus making the Americas the omitted group. In this estimation, owing
to the relatively small within-continent variation of GDP per capita, the coeﬃcient for the rule of
law is estimated somewhat lower at 1.45. Nevertheless, the coeﬃcient is signiﬁcant at high levels,
the ﬁrst stage is well identiﬁed, and the overidentiﬁcation cannot be rejected.
Column 7 adds ethnic fractionalization from Alessina et al. (2004) to the estimation. This
variable takes values between 0 and 1 and is higher for societies that are ethno-linguistically more
fractionalized. Such fractionalization could be detrimental for institutional outcomes, since inter-
nal conﬂict arises more often, thereby making it easier for the ruling elite to play oﬀ groups against
each other, as highlighted for example by Padro-I-Miquel (2007). Conﬁrming the identiﬁcation
18assumption made in the empirical analysis of Mauro (1995), fractionalization indeed inﬂuences
development mostly through its impact on institutional outcomes. However, the addition of this
variable has no impact on the main and interaction eﬀects of endowments, nor on the estimated
coeﬃcient for the rule of law.
In Column 8, to control for a much richer set of geographic information, the speciﬁcation adds
seven geographic variables to the estimation. The logarithm of elevation, a landlocked dummy,
distance from the equator, the length of coastline, the percentage of a country’s surface that is
arable, and the “Total Sum of Minerals” measure — all from Parker (1997) — are included to the
estimation. Total sum of minerals is equal to the sum of the country’s share in world reserves in
the 20 most important minerals (excluding oil). The estimation also adds Malaria Ecology from
Kiszewski et al. (2004).11
The two last robustness checks of Table 4 examine whether the importance of institutions
hinges on the use of the score for the rule of the law to measure institutional outcomes. In
Column 9, I use the 1996 to 2004 average for “Control of Corruption” from Kaufmann et al.
(2005), measuring the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain. Control of
corruption is standardized in the same fashion as is the score for the rule of law. The second-
stage coeﬃcients for these two (instrumented) measures of institutional outcomes hence can easily
be compared. Indeed, the coeﬃcient is nearly identical; it is estimated at 1.67 as compared to
1.70 when using the score for the rule of law.
In Column 10, I use the score for “Constraints on the Executive” (xconst) from the Polity IV
database. The xconst score measures the extent of institutionalized constraints on the decision-
making powers of chief executives. It takes values from zero to seven, with a higher score being
associated with better institutional outcomes. The coeﬃcient is estimated at 0.59 and is highly
signiﬁcant. Again, this result is in line with the previously presented results: a one standard-
deviation (1.96) diﬀerence in the score for democracy is associated with a diﬀerence in GDP per
capita of 1.16 log points.12
11The results of this estimation have to be interpreted with care since I do not include the interaction of the
additional geographic variables with the colony dummy to the ﬁrst stage.
12When using the score for constraints on the executive, temperature and its interaction with the colony dummy
have been dropped from the estimation, since the overidentiﬁcation test would reject otherwise.
19For a wide set of robustness test, I ﬁnd that institutions and endowments are both economically
and statistically signiﬁcant forces of development, with institutions being the major force of
development. I next highlight two channels through which endowments have aﬀected colonization
policies and two channel through which they aﬀect income directly.
5 Disease, Institutions, and Prosperity
This section applies the methodology developed above to examine the theory of the colonial
origins of institutions developed by Acemoglu et al. (2001), i.e., I examine whether the correlation
between disease and income can be attributed to the direct importance of germs for prosperity or
to the indirect eﬀect of settler mortality on institutional development during colonization.
To this end, I construct a measure of the geographic potential for disease termed "Early
Disease Environment" (EDE). Following the two-step methodology developed by Kiszewski et al.
(2004) and Sachs (2003), EDE is constructed by ﬁrst estimating the relation between the settler
mortality rates from Acemoglu et al. (2001) and a set of geographic variables that are ex ante
likely to be correlated with disease. Next, I use the estimated relation between geography and
disease to construct the geographic potential for disease in 151 nations.
The empirical strategy of this section is motivated by the following. "Settler mortality mea-
sures the disease environment as European settlers arrived and thereby provides an exogenous
indicator of "germs"" (Easterly and Levine (2003), p. 12). This exogenous indicator of germs
is well suited to estimating the direct and the indirect eﬀects of disease. It is straightforward to
enlarge the sample of Acemoglu et al. (2001) since the natural prevalence of germs is determined
by a country’s climate and landscape. One can estimate this relation between climate and disease
by using the mortality rates collected from historical sources and a set of geographic variables.
The estimated relation between germs and geography can then be extrapolated to construct a
measure of early disease environment using the widely available geographic information.
In Column 1 of Table 5, the dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the settler mortality
rate collected by Acemoglu et al. (2001).13 The independent variables are average annual temper-
13In Table 5, Malta and the Bahamas are missing because their population is smaller than 500,000. See sample
criterion above.
20ature, minimum monthly rainfall, and maximum monthly rainfall from Parker (1997). Warmer
climate and areas with pronounced dry (low minimum monthly rain) or wet seasons (high maxi-
mum monthly rain) are characterized by high mortality rates. All three regressors are signiﬁcant.
The bottom of Table 5 reports a p-value corresponding to the joint null-hypothesis that the in-
cluded geographic variables together do not matter for mortality. This hypothesis is rejected at
the 0.1% signiﬁcance level in all regressions of Table 5. Column 2 adds four dummies that respec-
tively equal one if a country is characterized by natural incidence of savanna, natural incidence
of temperate grassland or forest, is characterized by Mediterranean climate, or has mountains.
It also adds a measure of the temperature at maximum humidity. All variables are from Parker
(1997). With the exception of the mountain dummy, all added variables are signiﬁcant.14 To
check whether the selection of the geographic variables in Column 2 is exhaustive, I next add
distance from the equator (Column 3) and the fraction of the population living in temperate
areas (KGPTEMP from Mellinger et al. (2000), Column 4) to the estimation. Conditional on the
other variables, these two measures are not signiﬁcant predictors of mortality.
The data of Acemoglu et al. (2001) has been criticized by Albouy (2008), who argues that
the mortality rates are not comparable because they are sampled from diﬀerent populations.15
Column 5 controls for the sampling population and adds three dummies that respectively equal
one if the mortality rate was sampled from soldiers in campaign, from bishops, or from forced
laborers. Indeed, the sampling population has a sizeable inﬂuence on mortality. Compared to the
omitted group — soldiers stationed in barracks — soldiers in a campaign are Exp[0.71] ≈ 2 times as
likely to die from disease. Also forced laborers are more likely to die from disease, whereas bishops
faced a slightly lower mortality rate. The bottom of Table 5 reports the p-value corresponding
to the joint null-hypothesis that these three population dummies equal zero, which is rejected at
the 5% level.
Using the estimated coeﬃcient relating geography and settler mortality in Column 5 of Table
14In Columns 2 to 5 of Table 5, maximum monthly rainfall is not signiﬁcant; this is symptomatic of the high
degree of collinearity between the minimum and maximum monthly rainfall. Inclusion of maximum rainfall improves
the ﬁt of the model considerably.
15An earlier version of Albouy’s work also criticizes other aspects of the mortality rates collected by Acemoglu
et al. (2001). The working paper version of this study adresses all his revisions, with results identical to the ones
presented below.
215, I next predict several measures of the geographic potential for disease in 151 countries. In the
analysis below, I refer to this measure as "Early Disease Environment," or EDE. Paralleling the
deﬁnition of "settler mortality" in Acemoglu et al. (2001), EDE refers to the logarithm of the
annualized probability of death for European males in the age cohort of soldiers. It is important
to note that the use of EDE — measuring the hypothetical mortality rate rather than the actual
one — is in accordance with the institution-building hypothesis of Acemoglu et al. (2001), who
provide evidence that knowledge about the widespread prevalence of disease alone was enough
to deter migration to a colony. The estimation takes into account the sampling population, and
when predicting, I partial out the population dummies. Since soldiers stationed in barracks are
the omitted group, EDE measures the potential annual mortality of soldiers stationed in barracks.
Table 6 displays the relation between EDE, institutions, and income diﬀerences. The upper
Panel B presents the second-stage estimation between disease, institutional outcomes, and income.
The lower Panel A presents the relation between disease and institutional outcomes. EDE is
strongly correlated with development in former colonies, while this is not the case in the rest of
the world. In the estimation of Column 1 that is restricted to former colonies, a 1% lower level
of early disease environment is associated with a 1.17% higher income per capita and a 0.566
percentage points higher score of the rule of law. In a non-colonized nation, the same diﬀerence
is associated with a 0.29% higher income per capita and a 0.022 percentage points higher score
of the rule of law (see Column 2).
Column 3 disentangles the direct and indirect institution-building eﬀect of disease on prosper-
ity. The assumption identifying the relation between institutions and income is that the additional
impact of disease in former colonies is the exclusive result of the adopted colonization policies and,
thus, institutions. A one standard-deviation diﬀerence in institutional quality is estimated to re-
sult in a diﬀerence in income per capita of 1.62 (≈ (1.17 − 0.29)/(0.566 − 0.022))l o gp o i n t s .
Column 3 also documents that disease environment has a large direct eﬀect on income. For given
institutional quality, a one standard-deviation higher level of EDE is associated with a 0.256 log
points lower level of income per capita.16
16This ﬁnding is in line with the results of Weil (2007), who estimates that health has a signiﬁcant but small
eﬀect on income per capita.
22Although these ﬁndings highlight the importance of germs for colonization policies, they also
document that the point estimates of Acemoglu et al. (2001) are somewhat too large since they
attribute all of the correlation between disease and development to the institutional channel.
Column 4 documents this bias. Consider again a 1% diﬀerence in EDE in the estimation of
Column 4 including only colonies. This is associated with an increase of score of the rule of law
by 0.566 percentage points. Since the direct eﬀect of mortality is restricted to equal zero, the
estimation attributes all of the diﬀerence in income levels to institutional quality. The coeﬃcient
of institutions in Column 4 is hence estimated at 2.077, which — up to rounding — satisﬁes 0.566∗
2.077 = 0.566 ∗ 1.624 + 0.256. The importance of institutions is overstated by around 27% in the
sample restricted to former colonies.
The remainder of Table 6 repeats some of the robustness tests of Table 4. Column 5 excludes all
African countries from the estimation. Column 6 excludes the four European oﬀshoots Australia,
Canada, New Zealand, and the USA. Instead of excluding former colonies, Column 7 excludes the
20 former members of the Warsaw Pact. For these robustness tests, I again ﬁnd that institutions
are the main determinant of development, while disease also does have a substantially smaller,
but non-negligible direct eﬀect.17
6 Location and Legal Origin
This section applies the methodology of this study to examine the theory of the importance of
the origin of the legal system developed by La Porta et al. (1997, 1998, and 1999). These authors
argue that diﬀerences in the historical origins of the legal system — most notably whether the
country has adopted a system based on common or civil law — resulted in considerable diﬀerences
in economic outcomes. The authors are well aware that initially more successful countries could
have adopted better legal systems, but argue that the relation is causal since legal institutions
were often superimposed by a foreign colonizer. They further argue that the random variation
in legal systems that was induced by colonization can be utilized to establish the eﬀect of legal
origin on prosperity.
17A semiparametric estimation similar to those of Panel B in Table 2 does not provide any evidence that the
signiﬁcance of the interaction coeﬃcient is the result of a latent nonlinear main eﬀect of disease.
23In this section, I ﬁrst document that colonizer identity and, consequently, legal origin were
not assigned randomly, but vary systematically with a country’s location, in particular with its
relative proximity to the respective colonizers as well as the absolute distance from Europe. This
is potentially worrying, since proximity to export markets has a substantial direct impact on
development.
Are coastal nations on average richer due to the generally positive impact of access to the
open sea, or rather, because the naval power Britain tended to colonize such nations more often?
To answer this question, I ﬁrst estimate the probability that a colony adopts a particular legal
system given the country’s geographic location. Using this model, I then predict measures of
"relative proximity" to Britain, France, and other nations for the entire sample and estimate
whether proximity did aﬀect development diﬀerently in the group of former colonies and in the
group of non-colonized countries.
I ﬁnd that colonization has partly reversed the eﬀect of proximity to Europe. Countries that
were likely to be colonized by Britain, on average, are remote from other markets to trade with,
which is detrimental to growth. Consequently, the estimations of this paper suggest that the
causal eﬀect of legal origin on development is in fact larger than what empirical exercises along
the lines of La Porta et al. (1999) suggest.
To what extent did location aﬀect a former colony’s legal origin? The upper scatter plot of
Figure 4 relates a dummy that equals one for former British colonies to the logarithm of the
country’s relative distance from France. The relative distance from France is deﬁned as distance
from France divided by distance from Britain. The lower scatter plot of Figure 4 relates the same
dummy to the logarithm of the average distance from France and the UK. These two scatter
plots suggest that British colonies are, when compared to French ones, relatively closer to Britain
and more distant from Europe in absolute terms. Table 7 examines the statistical signiﬁcance
of these patterns. It relates the relative distances from the colonizers and other measures of
endowments to the probability of being colonized by or adopting the legal system of a certain
country. In all speciﬁcations, I estimate the probability of adopting a particular legal system
conditional on having been colonized. This conditionality is appropriate, since I want to establish
the eﬀect of adopting a particular legal system conditional on the fact that the legal system has
24been superimposed by a foreign power.
In the Probit estimations of Columns 1 to 4, the dependent variable is a dummy equal to one
for former British colonies. The sample includes all countries that have been colonized by either
France or Britain. The dependent variables are the log in distance from France minus log distance
from Britain (Column 1), the logarithm of the average distance from France and Britain (Column
2), “geographic openness” from Frankel and Romer (1999) (Column 3), and the distance from the
equator (Column 4). Compared to French colonies, former British colonies tend to be closer to
Britain. The latter nations are also more distant from Europe, geographically less open to trade,
and further away from the equator. The order of magnitude of the coeﬃcients suggests that
location was a major determinant of colonizer identity. For example, a one standard-deviation
diﬀerence (0.49) in the log-diﬀerence from Europe is associated with a 0.6 increase in the predicted
z-score for the country’s probability of becoming a British colony (for example, equivalent to a
move from the 50th to the 73rd percentile).
Not all countries have adopted the legal system of their colonizer. For example, Egypt was
a British protectorate, but its legal system is nevertheless based on the Napoleonic Code. To
demonstrate that location can also explain the legal origin rather than the colonial one, I next
relate the legal origin of former colonies to geography. In Columns 5 and 6, the dependent variable
is a British legal origin dummy and the sample is restricted to all former colonies with either British
or French legal origins. As is to be expected from the previous analysis, also countries that have
adopted the British legal system are relatively closer to Britain than to France and are relatively
more distant from Europe.
I next turn to a multinomial Probit estimation with three categories for French, British,
and other legal origin. The “other” group includes countries with German, Scandinavian, or
communist legal origin. Column 7 presents these two estimations relating the probability of
adopting a French (left part of Column 7) or “other” (right part of Column 7) legal system. Due
to the colinearity of the regressors, only few of the coeﬃcients are signiﬁcant, but the joint model
is signiﬁcant at the 5% level. I next predict the multinomial Probit model of Column 7 for the
entire sample (there is no distance data for West Bank and Gaza). The three resulting variables
measure the estimated probability that a country — had it been colonized — would have adopted
25a British, French, or other legal system.
Table 8 examines if this measure of “relative proximity” to Britain, France, and the other
group did also inﬂuence economic outcomes directly. Columns 1 and 2 serve to compare the
empirical approach of this study to the work of La Porta et al. For easier interpretation, the
sample ﬁrst includes only the measure of “Proximity to Britain,” hence comparing a British legal
origin to all other legal origins. In the estimation in Column 1 of Table 8, the sample includes
only former colonies and I instrument for the rule of law with the geographic prediction of the
British legal origin dummy. In this estimation, the ﬁrst-stage coeﬃcient is estimated at 1.49, i.e.,
a location closer to Britain such that the country is 10% more likely to adopt a British legal origin
(Proximity to Britain takes values between 0 and 1) leads to a 0.149 point higher predicted score
for the rule of law. In the second-stage estimation in Panel B, a change in the rule of law of one
standard deviation is associated with a change in income per capita of 1.43 log points.
The identifying assumption made in Column 1 is eq u i v a l e n tt ot h a to fL aP o r t ae ta l . ,i . e . ,t h a t
adopting a British legal system impacts development, but that proximity to Britain itself has no
impact on prosperity. I test this assumption in Column 2, where the sample also includes the group
of non-colonized countries. This estimation adds the colony dummy as well as the interaction of
proximity to Britain with the colony dummy to the estimation. Since the direct eﬀect of relative
proximity to the UK is present in all countries, it is captured in the main coeﬃcient of proximity
in the second stage estimation in Panel B.
The (insigniﬁcant) direct eﬀect of proximity to the UK is positive, so that the coeﬃcient for the
rule of law is estimated lower in Column 2 than in Column 1. The coeﬃcients for the rule of law in
Column 1 and 2 compare as follows. In a former colony, a change of 1 in the score for “proximity
to Britain” is associated with a diﬀerence in the score for the rule of law of 1.90 and a diﬀerence
in the logarithm of GDP per capita of 2.73, hence resulting in a coeﬃcient of 2.73/1.90=1.43. In
the speciﬁcation of Column 2 also allowing for proximity to Britain to aﬀect income directly, 0.34
log points of the diﬀerence in GDP are attributed to the direct impact of location on income and,
consequently, the coeﬃcient for the rule of law is estimated at (2.73-0.34)/1.90=1.26.
The most important pattern uncovered in Column 2 is that location has a sizeable direct
impact on institutional outcomes. For non-colonies, higher proximity to Britain is associated
26with worse institutional outcomes. This correlation — reﬂecting the detrimental eﬀect of the lack
of possibilities to trade and the associated eﬀect on the local political economy — leads to an
underestimation of the causal impact of legal origin on economic development. For example,
comparing the ﬁrst-stage coeﬃcients in Columns 1 and 2, the eﬀect of a higher likelihood of
adopting a legal system based on the British one is estimated around 50% higher in Column 2
than in the estimation in Column 1 that neglects the direct eﬀect of access to trade on economic
outcomes.
La Porta et al. underestimate the importance of legal origin on institutional development
because remoteness from Europe had two eﬀects on development that work in opposite directions.
On the one side, remote nations tended to be colonized by the British, hence resulting in better
institutional outcomes for remote colonies. On the other side, remoteness itself is detrimental for
growth. By the same token, this also suggests that also Frankel and Romer (1999) underestimate
the direct eﬀect of access to trade, although the measures of proximity constructed in this section
are arguably only crude measures for the geographic potential for trade since other centers of
economic activity, such as East Asia, have arisen after the World Wars.
The estimation in Column 3 adds relative proximity to France and its interaction with the
colony dummy to the estimation, hence the omitted group and omitted interaction in the ﬁrst
stage estimation are countries with German, Soviet, or Scandinavian Legal origin. Also in this
speciﬁcation, proximity to either France or Britain are not signiﬁcant direct determinants of
income, but the estimated coeﬃcients are non-negligible. More importantly, proximity does have
a sizeable and signiﬁcant direct eﬀect on the rule of law, that is of the opposite eﬀect as is the
indirect one on colonization policies. Hence, this speciﬁcation again conﬁrms that conventional
speciﬁcations underestimate the importance of legal origin.
I next examine the robustness of this ﬁnding. The estimation of Col u m n4e x c l u d e s4 7A f r i c a n
countries. The eﬀect of proximity to France on income per capita is estimated signiﬁcant and
positive once the African countries — mostly poor and relatively close to France — are excluded.
Consequently, this estimation results in a substantially smaller point estimate for the coeﬃcient
of rule of law. I next exclude the four Neo-Europes in Column 5 and the 20 former members of
the Warsaw pact in Column 6, with ﬁndings that are comparable to the baseline speciﬁcation in
27Column 3.
C o l u m n s1t o6e x c l u d et h eﬁve colonizers (Britain, France, Germany, Portugal, and Spain).
I include these to the estimation in Column 7, again with ﬁndings that are comparable to the
baseline estimation. Column 8 uses a diﬀerent measures of relative proximity. The respective
measures of proximity to Britain, France, Spain, and the omitted group are constructed from a
multinomial Probit estimation using the regressors used in Column 7 of Table 7, but with colonizer
dummies instead of legal origin dummies as the dependent variable. In this speciﬁcation, I also
distinguish the Spanish from the French legal origin (both are counted as French legal origin in
the other estimations). I ﬁnd that proximity to Spain has a large direct eﬀect on income, but
that the likelihood of being colonized by these two countries had a very detrimental eﬀect on
institutional quality.
In Column 9, I also add EDE and its interaction with the colony dummy to the estimation.
Both early disease environment and legal origins have a distinct eﬀect on institutional development
in former colonies. It is noteworthy that the ﬁrst stage coeﬃcients for both sets of instruments
(EDE and the measures of proximity; all interacted with the colony dummies) are signiﬁcant at
higher levels than in estimations that include only one set of instruments. Also a (not reported)
over identiﬁcation test examining whether the two sets of instrument predict diﬀerent coeﬃcients
for the rule of law is not rejected at the 10% level.18
7C o n c l u s i o n
In this paper, I estimate the partial eﬀects of geographic endowments and institutions on income.
The existing literature fails to distinguish between these two channels of development, since
endowments have inﬂuenced colonization policies and institutions, but they also aﬀect prosperity
directly.
The paper’s main insight is that one can utilize the interaction of history and geography to
distinguish the eﬀects of institutions and geographic endowments on comparative development.
18As has been noted by Acemoglu and Johnson (2005), settler mortality rates and legal origin dummies are nearly
orthogonal. The same is true for the geographic projections of mortality and legal origin and, consequently, the
signiﬁcance and economic importance of one set of instruments is not aﬀected by the inclusion of the other set to
the estimation.
28Historical events — such as colonization or the rise of trade with the new world — have inﬂuenced
how climate, transportation costs, and disease have aﬀected development. For example, during
colonization, the mortality rates of European settlers has aﬀected colonization policies, which in
turn determined the quality of institutions in the respective colonies. Disease environment may,
however, also directly aﬀect economic outcomes.
What distinguishes the direct impact of endowments on income from the indirect impact of
endowments on colonization policies is the following. While the direct impact is present in all
countries, the institutional channel only applies to a subset of countries, namely former colonies.
Based on this insight, I develop an instrumental variable framework that identiﬁes the relation
between income and institutions, while also allowing for geographic endowments to directly aﬀect
growth.
I ﬁnd that colonization policies and institutions are the major determinant of development,
but that endowments also have a sizeable direct impact on development. In a baseline estimation,
a one standard-deviation diﬀerence in colonization policies is associated with an over 34-fold
diﬀerence in income per capita. A one standard-deviation diﬀerence in the included endowments
is associated with an 8-fold diﬀerence in income per capita.
I next apply the developed methodology to examine the theories of Acemoglu et al. (2001)
and La Porta et al. (1997) that relate settler mortality rates or the historical origin of the legal
system to institutional outcomes. While I conﬁrm both of these theories, I also document that
their empirical evidence is somewhat biased. For the case of settler mortality rates, I document
that around a quarter of correlation between disease and income can indeed be attributed to the
direct eﬀect of the disease, rather than the indirect eﬀect of settler mortality rates on colonization
policies. For the case of legal origins, I document that the causal eﬀects of having a common
law is in fact larger than what the current empirical literature suggests. The reason for this is
the following. The naval nation Britain tended to colonize nations that are remote from Europe.
This remoteness has a detrimental direct eﬀect on development, hence partly masking the positive
impact of an eﬃcient legal system on economic development.
These two examples highlight the main conclusion of this study: while endowments do matter
directly for income diﬀerences today, they have mattered even more in the past. Since the same
29variables did impact development through diﬀerent channels at diﬀerent stages in history, only
the interaction of history and geography can clearly identify the forces of development.
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338 Appendix A: Proof of Remark 1
Remark 2 (Remark 1) Proof.
Consider ﬁrst the structural model (1) and (2), with the impact of colonization policies (3) netted
into the determinants of the rule of law.
Yi = e λY +e δY Ci + e αRi + e ηY Ei + e νY,i (6)
Ri = e λR +e δRCi + e ηREi + e βYi + Cie θREi + e νR,i (7)
The reduced from of the ﬁrst stage (7) is
Ri = λR + λ0
RCi + ηREi + θRCiEi + vR,i,
where λR =
h λR+h βh λY
1−h αh β , λ0
R =
h δR+h βh δY +h βγY +γR
1−h αh β , ηR =
h ηR+h βh ηY
1−h αh β , θR =
h θR
1−h αh β and vR,i =
h βγY +γR
1−h αh β Ci +
h  R,i+h βj  Y,i
1−h αh β . If either γY 6=0or γR 6=0 , vR,i is correlated with the colonization dummy. Denote all
estimated coeﬃcients by absuperscript. The four FOCs of the OLS minimization problem yield
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∂γY =0 . Next, consider the second-stage estimate of α, b α.T h i sc o e ﬃcient for
the rule of law is part of the solution to the second-stage least square minimization problem
min
f λY ,f λ0






c λY + c λ0
Y Ci + b α
− →





Ri is the projection of Ri obtained from the ﬁrst stage. It is important to note that since the
colony dummy b λ
0




= E [Ri].T h i s
has, however, no consequence for b α, which depends only on with-group variations and covariances.
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c λY + c λ0
Y Ci + b αf Ri + b ηY Ei
´´
. (12)
35Deﬁne the following average within-group covariances and average within-group variances.
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These variances and covariances equal the standard deﬁnitions, except that the across-group dif-
ferences in the mean between non-colonies and colonies are netted out. For example, the average
within-group variance of Ri is equal to the variance of Ri in the entire sample if the mean of R
is equal in former colonies and in the non-colonies. With this notation, the point estimate of α
equals
b α =
g Va r(E) g Cov(Y,R) − g Cov(Y,E) g Cov(R,E)




Due to the presence of the standard small-sample instrumental variable bias, it is not generally
true that E [b α]=α. However, since all of the elements in (13) depend exclusively on the within-





9 Appendix B: Alternative Deﬁnitions of Former Colonies
Table 9 documents that the results presented above are not dependent on the precise way in which
countries are being classiﬁed as former colonies versus non-colonized nations. In the main part of
the text, a country is classiﬁed as a former colony if it ever has either been an oﬃcial colony, was
under the control of an empire-aﬃliated organization such as the Dutch and British East Indies
Companies, had the status of protectorate of a non-adjacent empire, or lost the sovereignty over
its foreign policy following a military conﬂict with a non-adjacent empire. With this deﬁnition,
56 countries are classiﬁed as non-colonized nations, while 95 are classiﬁed as former colonies.
36Columns 1, 2 and 3 employ a "wide" deﬁnition of former colonies. In these two speciﬁcations,
the colony dummy also equals one if the country was under a League of Nations mandate after
World War I. This, in addition, classiﬁes Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, the Syrian Arab Republic and
West Bank and Gaza as former colonies. There are thus 100 former colonies and 51 non-colonized
nations. Column 1 repeats the baseline speciﬁcation including the three geographic variables
from Column 8 of Table 3. In Column 2 and 3 repeat the speciﬁcations respectively using EDE
or the measures of proximity. In Columns 3 to 6 a "narrower" deﬁnition of former colonies is
adopted. This colony dummy equals one only if the country ever has been an oﬃcial colony, was
under the control of an empire-aﬃliated organization such as the Dutch and British East Indies
Companies, or had the status of protectorate of a non-adjacent empire. This classiﬁes the United
Arab Emirates and Bhutan as non-colonized nations, leading to 93 former colonies.
For some countries, deﬁning whether the country has been a colony or not is diﬃcult. Ethiopia
has been colonized, but only during the period of 1936 to 1941. Korea has been a occupied
by Japan in 1910, again far later than other countries that are classiﬁed as colonies. Current
Liberia was founded by the empire-aﬃliated American Colonization Society, and to ensure that
the classiﬁcation rule is consistent, the country is counted as a former colony in the main text.
Finally, parts of China have been colonized, and the country was also under heavy foreign inﬂuence
during much of its modern history. Columns 7 to 9 exclude these four countries. In all estimations
of Table 9, the ﬁrst-stage estimation is a highly signiﬁcant predictor of institutional outcomes.
Also the estimated impact for institutions is signiﬁcant and comparable in magnitude to the
baseline estimation.
37Number of  Mean Standard  Min  Max Ethnic French Settler  Pop.  Density
Observations Deviation Value Value Fract.  Legal Org. Mortaltiy in 1500
Entire Sample
Log (GDP per Capita 2003) 151 7.525 1.629 4.443 10.556 -0.5234** -0.1444 -0.6886** -0.5628**
1996-2004 Avg. of "Rule of Law" 151 -0.023 0.966 -1.842 2.137 -0.4901** -0.2227** -0.6598** -0.5334**
Log (Avg. Elevation) 151 4.413 1.917 0.000 7.792 0.1098 0.0573 -0.039 -0.0499
Log (Avg. Rainfall) 151 4.335 0.841 1.253 6.481 0.1945* -0.0428 0.2919* -0.0233
Humidity (Afternoon Max.) 151 73.0% 10.2% 35.0% 92.0% -0.0551 -0.1195 0.2807* 0.0282
Avg. Temperature (Celsius) 151 18.715 8.019 -4.000 31.000 0.354** 0.4259** 0.5233** 0.408**
Log (Avg. Dist Europe) 151 9.514 0.750 7.658 10.94962 0.2096* 0.0586 -0.4502** -0.4788**
Latitude (in Degrees) 151 26.963 16.842 0.200 64.000 -0.5117** -0.3656** -0.4796** -0.2645*
Malaria Ecology 147 0.863 1.102 0.000 3.483 0.5424** 0.2039* 0.6885** 0.1113
Former Colonies
Log (GDP per Capita 2003) 95 7.066 1.538 4.443 10.472 -0.3762** -0.15 -0.6886** -0.5559**
1996-2004 Avg. of "Rule of Law" 95 -0.264 0.846 -1.842 2.003 -0.3573** -0.3209** -0.6598** -0.5369**
Log (Avg. Elevation) 95 4.343 2.043 0.000 7.792 0.0243 0.1335 -0.039 -0.0724
Log (Avg. Rainfall) 95 4.552 0.902 1.253 6.481 0.1257 -0.1525 0.2919* -0.0362
Humidity (Afternoon Max.) 95 71.0% 10.1% 35.0% 92.0% 0.1106 0.0599 0.2807* 0.0078
Avg. Temperature (Celsius) 95 23.116 4.991 4.000 31.000 0.2029 0.1873 0.5233** 0.4355**
Log (Avg. Dist Europe) 95 9.892 0.481 8.278 10.950 -0.2861* -0.2596* -0.4502** -0.4884**
Latitude (in Degrees) 95 17.004 11.134 0.200 53.000 -0.421** -0.1478 -0.4796** -0.2841**
Malaria Ecology 93 1.333 1.131 0.000 3.483 0.4943** 0.0276 0.6885** 0.1331
Non-Colonies
Log (GDP per Capita 2003) 56 8.302 1.488 5.319 10.556 -0.5980** 0.2278 - -
1996-2004 Avg. of "Rule of Law" 56 0.385 1.026 -1.316 2.137 -0.5483** 0.1766 - -
Log (Avg. Elevation) 56 4.532 1.693 0.000 7.201 0.3970** -0.0716 - -
Log (Avg. Rainfall) 56 3.967 0.562 2.398 5.242 -0.0967 -0.2328 - -
Humidity (Afternoon Max.) 56 76.4% 9.4% 44.0% 89.0% -0.0953 -0.2526 - -
Avg. Temperature (Celsius) 56 11.250 6.529 -4.000 29.000 0.036 0.4788** - -
Log (Avg. Dist Europe) 56 8.873 0.690 7.658 10.306 0.2938* -0.1710  - -
Latitude (in Degrees) 56 43.857 9.990 13.000 64.000 -0.2929* -0.2993* - -
Malaria Ecology 54 0.055 0.271 0.000 1.988 0.1974 -0.043 - -
Pairwise Correlation Coefficients Summary Statistics
Table 1 - Summary Statistics and Pairwise Correlations
Notes: Table 1 displays summary statistics and pair wise correlations between measures of geographic endowments and instrumentalvariables for institutional outcomes. The four 
instrumental variables are Ethnic Fractionalization from Alesina et al. (2004), a dummy equal to one in countries with FrenchLegal Origin from La Porta et al. (1997), the 
Logarithm of European Settler Mortality from Acemoglu et al. (2001), and the logarithm of the population density in 1500 from Acemoglu et al. (2002). The latter two variables 
are only available for former colonies.  The measures of endowments are from Parker (1997), except Malaria Ecology (from Kiszewski et al. (2004)) and Distance from Europe, 
which is equal to the average distance from France, the UK, and Spain in the CEPII distance data set; a * denotes a correlation coefficient significant at 5% and ** denotes a 
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Market Access Elevation Temperature Humidity Malaria  Latitude 
Sample Former Not All All All All All All All 
Colonies Colonized
Log Rainfall -0.24 0.28 0.28
[0.09]** [0.23] [0.23]
Log Rainfall * Colony -0.52
Y/N [0.24]*
Log (Avg. Dist. Europe) -0.79
[0.19]**
Log (Avg. Dist. Europe) 1.23
* Colony Y/N [0.28]**
Log Elevation -0.28
[0.06]**








Humidity * Colony Y/N -3.67
[1.59]*
Malaria Ecology (ME) -0.14
[0.13]




Latitude * Colony Y/N 0.01
[0.02]
Colony Y/N 1.55 -12.02 -1.65 0.96 2.11 -0.27 0.06
[0.98] [2.57]** [0.36]** [0.50] [1.19] [0.20] [0.59]
Main Effect (P Value): -- 0.057 0.117 0.041 0.686 0.160 0.290 0.001
Interaction Coefficient - - -0.65 0.202 0.12 -0.1 -3.68 -0.51 0.08
[0.31]* [.402] [0.11] [0.05]* [2.07] [0.48] [0.03]**
Observations 95 56 151 151 151 151 151 147 151
R-squared (OLS) 0.066 0.023 0.147 0.253 0.185 0.185 0.139 0.208 0.287
(1) - (3) Average Rainfall
Table 2 - The Different Effect of Endowments on Institutional Outcomes
Panel B: Semiparametric Estimation allowing for Nonlinear Main Effect. Dependent Variable is the 96-04 Avg. For the Rule of Law
Panel A: OLS Estimations. Dependent Variable is the 1996-2004 Average Score for "Rule of Law" from Kaufmann et al. (2005)
Notes: Panel A of Table 2 presents the OLS relation between geographic variables and the 1996 to 2004 average score of the "Rule of Law" from Kaufmann et al. (2005). Columns 1 and 2 
relate (the logarithm of) annual rainfall to the rule of law in the group of former colonies (1) and in the Group of non-colonies (2). From Column 3 onwards, the sample incl udes both groups 
and each estimation includes one measure of endowments, a dummy equal to one for former colonies, and the interaction of the dummy and the measure of endowments. From Column 3 
onwards , Panel B reproduces the specification of Panel A in a a semiparametric estimation. Each estimation is computed using Stata’s plreg command and allows for the main effect of the 
geographic variable to be nonlinear, while the interaction effect is restricted to be linear. Panel B reports the coefficientand the standard error for the linear interaction coefficient and the p-
value corresponding to the null hypothesis for the main effect of endowments. In Panel A, heteroscedasticity robust standard errors are reported in brackets; * significant at 5%; ** significant 
at 1%.
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( 1 )( 2 )( 3 )( 4 )( 5 )( 6 )( 7 )( 8 )
Sample: Fm. Colonies Non-colonies
Measure of Endowments Avg. Rainfall Temperature Remoteness
Estimation Type: OLS OLS IV IV IV OLS OLS IV
Rule of Law  1.31 1.39 1.92 1.69 1.70
[0.31]** [0.36]** [0.41]** [0.22]** [0.21]**
Humidity -1.44 3.38 -0.32 0.63 -0.21
[1.34] [2.15] [0.64] [1.18] [0.81]
Log Rainfall -0.13 -0.33 -0.07
[0.09] [0.16]* [0.11]
Avg. Temperature 0.01 -0.05 0.00
[0.02] [0.02]* [0.02]
Log (Avg. Dist. Europe) 0.04 -0.33 0.05
[0.16] [0.20] [0.14]
Colony y/n -0.4 -0.26 -0.1 -0.18 -0.17
[0.23] [0.25] [0.26] [0.22] [0.24]
R^2 0.009 0.046 - - - 0.2073
Humidity -0.85 2.82 2.82 0.47 2.36
[0.83] [1.36]* [1.36]* [0.74] [1.68]
Humidity * Colony Y/N -3.67 -1.57
[1.59]* [1.88]
Log Rainfall 0.28 -0.15 0.1
[0.23] [0.10] [0.23]
Log(Rainfall) * Colony -0.52 -0.37
Y/N [0.24]* [0.25]
Avg. Temperature 0 -0.03 0.04
[0.02] [0.01]** [0.02]
Avg. Temperature * -0.07 -0.1
Colony Y/N [0.02]** [0.03]**
Log (Avg. Dist. Europe) -0.79 -0.2 -0.76
[0.19]** [0.13] [0.19]**
Log (Avg. Dist. Europe) 1.23 1.09
* Colony Y/N [0.28]** [0.26]**
Colony y/n 2.11 1.55 0.96 -12.02 -5.93
[1.19] [0.98] [0.50] [2.57]** [3.09]
(Joint) Wald Test: Direct Effect of Endowments Equal to 0 (Either first- or second-stage estimation)
P Value Second Stage 0.616  0.167 0.641 - 0.0015 0.8399
P Value First Stage 0.040 0.222 0.894 - <0.0001 0.0001
Anderson Canonical Correlation LR Statistic (identification/IV relevance test all instrument)
P Value: -- 0.0203 0.0296 0.0059 - - <0.0001
Hansen J Test of Overidentication (all Instruments)
P Value: ------- 0.6352
Observations 95 56 151 151 151 151 151
R^2 (first stage) - - 0.139 0.147 0.185 - -
Hypothesis Tests 
(3) to (8): All Countries
Table 3  - Endowments, Institutions, and Income
Panel A: Dependent Variable is the 96-04 Avg. of "Rule of Law"
Panel B:  Dependent Variable is the Ln of GDP per Capita in 2003
(1) to (3) Humidity Humidity, Rain, Temp., Remoteness
Notes: Table 3 displays the relation between geography and institutional quality (Panel A) and the relation between endowments and/or institutional quality and income (Panel 
B). In Columns 1 to 3, the independent variable is humidity. In Column 1, the sample consists of 95 former colonies and in Column 2 it consists of 56 countries that have not 
been colonized. In all other estimations the sample includes all 151 countries and each regression also adds the interaction of the measure of geography with the colony dummy. 
In Panel B, Columns 1, 2, and 7 presents OLS results; in the other columns, the score for the rule of law is instrumented andtwo-stage least-squares estimates are presented. 
Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors in brackets; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Excluding Excluding Oil-  IV Excl. AUS Excl. Quantile IV With Continent Ethnic ad Geogr.
Af rica Rich N ations CAN, NZL, USA  Warsaw Pact Regression Dummies Fract. Controls Cont. Corpt.  Xconst
Rule of Law 1996 1.52 1.94 1.77 1.82 1.78 1.39 1.71 1.52
to  2004 [0.25]** [0.25]** [0.26]** [0.33]** [0.34]** [0.21]** [0.26]** [0.20]**
Control of Corruption 1.67
1996 to 2004 [0.20]**
Xconst Score 1999 0.59
(Politiy IV) [0.09]**
Humidity -1.24 -0.38 -0.19 -0.64 -0.18 -0.25 -0.35 -0.09 -0.86 -0.26
[0.75] [1.06] [0.89] [1.04] [1.68] [0.56] [0.84] [0.74] [0.89] [1.13]
Log Rainfall  -0.16 -0.03 -0.07 0 -0.13 -0.09 -0.06 0.01 -0.12 -0.39
[0.07]* [0.14] [0.11] [0.15] [0.18] [0.09] [0.11] [0.07] [0.11] [0.17]*
Avg. Temperature 0 0.01 0 0.01 -0.01 0.01 0 -0.01 0.01
[0.01] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.03] [0.01] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02]
Log (Avg. Dist. Eur) -0.21 0.28 0.12 0.01 0.21 -0.35 0.05 -0.09 0.17 -0.24
[0.17] [0.17] [0.17] [0.15] [0.45] [0.21] [0.15] [0.14] [0.16] [0.17]
Ethnic Fractionalization -0.05
[0.45]
Panel A: First Stage Estimation - in (1) - (8) Dep. Var is the 1996 to 2004 Average of the Rule of Law Control of  Constraints
Corruptionon Executive
Humidity 2.36 2.18 2.36 3.55 0.85 2.5 2.39 0.48 2.41 5.24
[1.71] [2.30] [1.68] [1.59]* [1.44] [1.78] [1.59] [1.78] [1.60] [2.56]*
Humidity * Colony Y/N -1.01 -1.32 -1.83 -2.75 -0.01 -2.07 -1.51 -0.31 -1.15 -7.72
[2.30] [2.46] [1.87] [1.80] [1.65] [1.97] [1.83] [1.97] [1.78] [3.00]*
Log Rainfall 0.1 0.35 0.1 -0.18 0.11 0.12 0.07 0.14 0.12 0.94
[0.23] [0.26] [0.23] [0.27] [0.17] [0.23] [0.21] [0.23] [0.21] [0.43]*
Log(Rainfall) * Colony -0.23 -0.6 -0.35 -0.1 -0.41 -0.34 -0.33 -0.26 -0.38 -1.12
Y/N [0.30] [0.29]* [0.25] [0.29] [0.19]* [0.25] [0.23] [0.25] [0.23] [0.47]*
Avg. Temperature 0.04 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.04 dropped
[0.02] [0.03] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.03] [0.02]
Avg. Temperature * -0.11 -0.06 -0.07 -0.08 -0.08 -0.11 -0.09 -0.09 -0.1 dropped
Colony Y/N [0.03]** [0.04] [0.03]* [0.03]** [0.03]** [0.03]** [0.03]** [0.03]** [0.03]**
Log (Avg. Dist. Eur) 0.82 1.08 1.01 0.83 1.17 0.7 0.82 1.12 1.16 3.13
[0.53] [0.34]** [0.25]** [0.27]** [0.23]** [0.32]* [0.25]** [0.26]** [0.26]** [0.44]**
Log (Avg. Dist. Eur) -0.76 -0.71 -0.76 -0.5 -1 -0.84 -0.65 -0.76 -0.87 -1.3
* Colony Y/N [0.19]** [0.19]** [0.19]** [0.20]* [0.15]** [0.28]** [0.18]** [0.18]** [0.18]** [0.32]**
Ethnic Fractionalization -1.14
[0.29]**
Colony Dummy (both sta yyyyyyyyyy
Continent Dummies y
Further Geographic Controls y
Joint Wald Test: Direct Effect of Endowments Equal to 0 (Either first- or second-stage estimation)
P Value Second Stage 0.0143 0.4999 0.7871 0.8877 0.8263 0.4176 0.8425 <0.001 0.1119 0.0257
P Value First Stage <0.001 <0.001 0.0001 0.0028 - 0.0134 0.0005 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001
Anderson Canonical Correlation LR Statistic (identification/IV relevance test all instrument)
P Value 0.004 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 - <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001
Hansen J Test of Overidentication (all Instruments)
P Value 0.8353 0.2141 0.3982 0.404 - 0.209 0.584 0.824 0.838 0.0864
Observations 104 117 147 132 151 151 148 141 151 145
R2 First Stage 0.282 0.389 0.364 0.417 - 0.429 0.448 0.548 0.366 0.452
Instrumenting for
 Model Information and Hypothesis Tests 
Table 4 - Robustness Analysis (Two-Stage Least Squares Estimation Results)
Panel B:OLS or Second Stage Estimation  - Dependent Variable is the Ln of GDP per Capita in 2003
Notes: Table 4 presents robustness tests for two-stage least-squares relation between institutions, endowments, and income. In the second-stage estimation of Panel B, the dependent variable is the 
logarithm of 2003 per capita GDP. In Panel A, the dependent variable a measure of institutional outcomes. In Columns 1 to 8, this measure is equal to the 1996 to 2004 average for the score of the 
rule of law. The estimation in turn excludes 47 African countries (Column 1), 34 countries with more than 50,000 barrels of proven oil reserves per capita in 1994 (2), the four neo-Europes (3), and 
all members of the Warsaw pact except Russia (4). The estimation in Column 5 adds four continent dummies for Africa, Asia, Oceania, and Asia (neither first- nor second- stage coefficients for the 
dummies are reported). Column 6 presents the baseline specification estimated in a quantile instrumental variable estimation.Results for the 50th percentile are reported. Column 7 adds ethnic 
fractionalization from Alesina et al. (2004). Column 8 adds Malaria Ecology from Kiszewski et al. (2004) and elevation, a landlocked dummy, distance from the equator, the length of coastline, the 
percentage of a country’s surface that is arable, and the “Total Sum of Minerals” from Parker (1997) to the estimation. Columns 9 and 10 repeat the baseline specification, using the 1996 to 2004 
average for control of corruption from Kaufmann et al. (2005) and the score for “Constraints on the Executive” (xconst) from the Polity IV database as proxies for institutional outcomes. Control of 
Corruption is standardized, with higher values associated with more control of corruption. xconst takes value between 0 and 7, with higher values associated with more constrained executives. 
Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors in brackets; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%.
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( 1 )( 2 )( 3 )( 4 )( 5 )
Rainfall &  Extensive  adding adding Extensive Model
Temperature Georg. Model KGTEMP Latitude & Pop. Dummies 
Avg. Temperature 0.63 0.64 0.58 0.61 0.49
(std.) [0.17]** [0.33] [0.35] [0.34] [0.31]
Min. of Monthly Rain -0.32 -0.32 -0.36 -0.33 -0.19
(std.) [0.06]** [0.05]** [0.10]** [0.05]** [0.07]**
Max. of Monthly Rain 0.22 0.16 0.17 0.15 0.14
(std.) [0.09]* [0.08] [0.10] [0.08] [0.09]
Temp. at max Humidity -0.68 -0.64 -0.71 -0.51
(std.) [0.28]* [0.37] [0.29]* [0.29]
Savanna y/n 0.6 0.53 0.55 0.51
[0.19]** [0.21]* [0.22]* [0.21]*
Temperate Vegetation y/n -0.7 -0.51 -0.6 -0.61
[0.25]** [0.26] [0.31] [0.19]**
Mediteranean Climate y/n -1.08 -1.11 -1.05 -0.95
[0.31]** [0.35]** [0.32]** [0.30]**
Mountains y/n -0.49 -0.55 -0.51 -0.62





Campaign Rate y/n 0.71
[0.28]*
Forced Laborer Rate y/n 0.56
[0.26]*
Bishop Rate y/n -0.01
[0.24]
p-value: geography <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001
p-value: Pop. dummies na na na na 0.023
Observations 62 62 60 62 62
Clusters 35 35 35 35 35
R-squared 0.48 0.66 0.65 0.67 0.72
Dependent Variable is the Standardized Ln of the Mortality Rate from Acemoglu et al. (2001)
Table 5 - The Geographic Determinants of Soldier Mortality Rates
Model Information and Hypothesis Tests
Notes: Table 5 presents the relation between geography and the settler mortality estimates from Acemoglu et al. (2001). All dependent 
variables except dummies and KGPTEMP are standardized. KGPTEMP takes values between 0 and 1 and is equal to the fraction of 
the population living in temperate areas. The population dummies used in Column 5 are from Albouy (2008). The bottom rows report
two Wald tests corresponding to the joint null hypothesis that the geographic variables all equal 0 and that the three population 
dummies all equal 0 (Column 5 only). Heteroscedasticity robust and clustered standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 5%; 
**significant at 1%;
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Former Not  Full Former w/o African w/o AUS, CAN w/o Warsaw Full
Colonies Colonized Sample Colonies Countries NZL, USA Pact Sample
OLS OLS IV IV IV IV IV IV
Rule of Law  1.624 2.077 1.12 1.89 1.54 1.191
[0.265]** [0.233]** [0.28]** [0.44]** [0.22]** [0.377]**
EDE -1.174 -0.292 -0.256 -0.27 -0.25 -0.3 0.081
[0.121]** [0.241] [0.100]* [0.10]* [0.12]* [0.09]** [0.259]
EDE Squared -0.098
[0.072]
Colony y/n 0.108 0.19 0.34 0.21 0.024
[0.180] [0.14] [0.29] [0.22] [0.149]
R-Sq 0.433 0.025 - - - - - -
EDE -0.566 -0.022 -0.022 -0.566 -0.022 -0.022 0.122 -0.145
[0.090]** [0.158] [0.157] [0.090]** [0.158] [0.157] [0.170] [0.322]
EDE* Colony y/n -0.543 -0.639 -0.402 -0.688 -0.627
[0.181]** [0.230]** [0.179]* [0.193]** [0.256]*
EDE Squared 0.035
[0.073]
Colony y/n -0.397 -0.35 -0.519 -0.9 -0.429
[0.185]* [0.199] [0.184]** [0.213]** [0.181]*
Wald Test: Direct Effect of Endowments Equal to 0 (Either first- or second-stage estimation)
P Value Second Stage
P Value First Stage - - 0.225 - 0.229 0.225 0.674 0.4234
Anderson Canonical Correlation LR Statistic (identification/IV relevance test all instrument)
P Value: - - 0.0017 0 0.0097 0.0209 0.0001 0.0164
Observations 95 56 151 95 104 147 131 151
R-sq first stage 0.332 0 0.266 0.332 0.131 0.236 0.392 0.267
Table 6 - Estimating the Partial Effects of Disease and Institutional Quality
Panel B: OLS or Second Stage Results - Dependent Variable is the Ln of GDP per Capita in 2003
Panel A: First Stage Estimation - Dependent Variable is the 96-04 Avg. of "Rule of Law"
Model Information and Hypothesis Tests
Notes: Table 6 presents the first stage relation between early disease environment and institutional quality (Panel A) and the second stage relation between instrumented 
institutional quality and income (Panel B). The measure of early disease environment (EDE) is predicted from Table 5, Column 5. The variable "EDE * Colony y/n" is the 
interaction of the colony dummy and EDE. "EDE Square" equals (EDE+2.72)^2, where -2.72 is the minimum value of EDE in the sample. Heteroscedasticity robust 
standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
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( 1 )( 2 )( 3 )( 4 )( 5 )( 6 )
Independent Variable Rel. Distance Abs. Distance Openess Latitude Rel. Distance Abs. Distance
M o d e l P r o b i tP r o b i tP r o b i tP r o b i tP r o b i tP r o b i t
Sample 
Dependent Variable Uk Colony  Uk Colony  Uk Colony  Uk Colony  Uk Legal  Uk Legal  French Legal  Other Legal 
Dummy Dummy Dummy Dummy Origin Dummy Origin Dummy Origin Dummy Origin Dummy
Log (Dist. from France 7.17
/ Dist. from UK) [2.60]**
Log (Dist. from France  1.21
+ and UK) [0.43]**




Log ((Dist FRA +Dist. ESP) 3.12
 / Dist. GBR) [1.14]**
Log (Dist FRA + Dist. ESP +  0.68
Dist GBR) [0.31]*
Log (Dist FRA / (Dist FRA +  -19.85 153.09
Dist. DEU + Dist GBR)) [7.28]** [102.49]
Log (Dist GBR / (Dist FRA + -12.45 30.77
 Dist. DEU + Dist GBR)) [5.18]* [57.94]
Log (Dist FRA + Dist. DEU  -0.16 0.36
+ Dist GBR) [0.80] [3.11]
Observations 58 58 56 58 91 91




Table 7 - Location and Legal Origin (Probit Estimations)
(5), (6): French or UK Legal Origin
Multinominal Probit
(1)- (4): Former French or UK Colonies
Rel & Abs. Distance
Notes: Table 7 presents the relation between endowments and the colonizer identity or legal origin. In Columns 1 to 4 , the Probit estimation results each relate a measure of endowments to the 
probability of having been colonized by the UK. In Columns 1 to 4, the sample is restricted to the group of former French or British colonies, so that the estimated coefficients measure the 
impact of endowments on the relative likelihood of being colonized by either France or the UK. In Column 1, the independent variable is the logarithm of the country’s relative distance to 
France, defined as the distance to France divided by the distance to the UK. In Column 2, the independent variable is logarithm of the average distance to France and UK, defined as the sum of 
Distance from France and distance from the UK. In Column 3, the independent variable is the “geographic openness to trade” from Frankel and Romer (1999). In Column 4, the dependent 
variable is the distance from the equator. In Columns 5 and 6, the sample includes all former colonies with either French or British legal origin in La Porta et al. (1998). The independent 
variables are the relative distance from France or Spain (averaged) compared to the distance from Britain and the logarithm of the absolute difference from France, Spain, and Britain. In 
Column 7, the multinominal Probit estimation includes all 95 former colonies and the outcome takes different values for UK, French, or “other” legal origin. The left sub-column reports the 
results for the French Legal Origin and the right sub column reports the results for the “other” legal origin dummy. The independent variables include the relative difference from the UK, the 
relative difference from France, and the absolute average difference from France, Germany, and the UK. All distance data is from the CEPII  distance data set; * significant at 5%; ** significant 
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Sample: only former  all w/o  5 all w/o  5 w/o Colonizer,  w/o Colonizer, w/o Colonizer, all w/o Colonizer, w/o Colonizer
Colonies Colonizers Colonizers w/o African w/o AUS, CAN w/o Warsaw P. Nations
Relative Proximity: & Spain
Panel B: OLS or Second Stage Results - Dependent Variable is the Ln of GDP per Capita in 2003
Rule of Law  1.36 1.17 1.4 0.89 1.43 1.36 1.37 1.42 1.51
[0.36]** [0.27]** [0.15]** [0.20]** [0.17]** [0.17]** [0.14]** [0.14]** [0.14]**
Proximity to UK 0.28 0.38 -0.06 0.4 0.65 0.38 0.26 1.53
[0.23] [0.21] [0.27] [0.22] [0.41] [0.21] [0.22] [1.16]
Proximity to France 0.23 1.03 0.19 0.44 0.2 0.29 1.12
[0.25] [0.32]** [0.25] [0.33] [0.20] [0.24] [1.12]




Colony y/n -0.5 -0.48 -0.36 -0.45 -0.52 -0.48 -0.12 -0.32
[0.18]** [0.17]** [0.21] [0.19]* [0.20]** [0.17]** [0.16] [0.23]
Panel A: First Stage Estimation - Dependent Variable is the 96-04 Avg. of "Rule of Law"
Proximity to UK 1.49 -0.69 -0.9 -0.9 -0.9 -2.08 -0.9 -0.9 -0.63
[0.47]** [0.34]* [0.32]** [0.32]** [0.32]** [0.33]** [0.31]** [0.31]** [3.70]
Proximity to UK * 2.18 1.61 2.25 1.08 2.78 1.61 1.91 4.47
Colony y/n [0.58]** [1.01] [1.34] [0.96] [1.02]** [1.01] [0.81]* [3.84]
Proximity to France 1.5 1.5 1.5 0.28 1.21 1.21 0.88
[0.36]** [0.36]** [0.36]** [0.37] [0.26]** [0.27]** [3.53]
Proximity to France* -2.22 -1.56 -2.38 -1 -1.93 -1.12 1.38
Colony y/n [0.84]** [1.00] [0.79]** [0.85] [0.81]* [0.65] [3.64]
Proximity to Spain 7.71
[33.57]




EDE * Colony y/n -0.52
[0.16]**
Colony y/n -1.33 -0.49 -0.88 -0.28 -1.66 -0.54 -0.89 -3.36
[0.28]** [0.82] [1.01] [0.77] [0.82]* [0.82] [0.63] [3.61]
Joint Wald Test: Direct Effect of Endowments on Income Equal to 0 (combining first- and second-stage effect)
P Value: - 0.275 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001
Anderson Canonical Correlation LR Statistic (identification/IV relevance test all instrument)
P Value: 0.0022 0.0006 0.0001 0.0048 0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001
Hansen J Test of Overidentication (all Instruments)
P Value: - - 0.4246 0.9472 0.4192 0.3117 0.4419 0.289 0.7014
Observations 95 145 145 98 141 125 150 145 145
R-sq first stage 0.094 0.148 0.198 0.129 0.235 0.374 0.252 0.378 0.313
(1),(2): UK vs. Non-UK Legor (3) - (8): Proximity from Column 7 of Table 8 (FRA, UK, other)
Table 8 - Proximity,  Legal Origin, and Prosperity (Two-Stage Least Square Estimations)
Model Information and Hypothesis Tests
Notes: Table 8 presents the relation between relative proximity to the colonizers, institutional outcomes, and income. Panel A presents the first-stage estimations relating proximity to 
institutional outcomes and Panel B the second-stage estimations relating institutional outcomes and proximity to income per capita. In Column 1, the sample includes only former colonies and 
the independent variable in Panel A is the relative proximity to the UK. In Column 2, the first-stage estimation adds the colony dummy and the interaction of this dummy with relative 
proximity to the UK. The second-stage estimation adds relative proximity to the UK. The sample includes the entire sample except five colonizers (DEU, ESP, FRA, PRT, GBR). Column 3 
adds relative proximity to France measure, making the proximity to “other” nations the omitted group (rel. proximity to UK, to France and to “other” add up to one). From Col umn 4 onwards, 
robustness tests are presented. Column 4 excludes African countries, 5 the four neo-Europes, and Column 6 includes the former members of the Warsaw Pact. Column 7 adds the five 
colonizers to the sample. Column 8 adds EDE to both the second- and first-stage estimation and EDE interacted with the colony dummy to the first stage. Column 9 uses different measures of 
proximity (see text). Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. 
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Regressors: Geographic Early Disease Proximity to Geographic Early Disease Proximity to Temp, Elev. Early Disease Proximity to
Variables Environment Colonizers Variables Environment Colonizers Rainfall Environment Colonizers
Rule of Law  1.55 1.58 1.43 1.65 1.66 1.39 1.68 1.57 1.28
[0.26]** [0.25]** [0.15]** [0.26]** [0.26]** [0.16]** [0.34]** [0.36]** [0.23]**
Humidity -0.1 -0.08 -0.08
[0.11] [0.11] [0.12]
Log Rainfall  -0.2 -0.24 -0.2
[0.79] [0.81] [0.86]
Avg. Temperature 0 0 0
[0.02] [0.02] [0.02]
EDE -0.28 -0.24 -0.29
[0.10]** [0.10]* [0.14]*
Proximity to UK 0.44 0.38 0.28
[0.21]* [0.21] [0.25]
Proximity to France 0.2 0.27 0.09
[0.24] [0.25] [0.28]
Humidity 0.13 0.01 -0.12
[0.26] [0.24] [0.26]
Humidity * Colony Y -0.37 -0.23 -0.11
[0.28] [0.25] [0.28]
Log Rainfall 4.65 4.14 2.94
[1.89]* [1.59]* [1.71]
Log(Rainfall) * Colo -3.75 -3.14 -1.88
Y/N [2.06] [1.80] [1.90]
A v g .  T e m p e r a t u r e 0 . 0 40 . 0 40 . 0 1
[0.02]* [0.02]* [0.02]
Avg. Temperature * -0.11 -0.11 -0.08
Colony Y/N [0.03]** [0.03]** [0.03]**
EDE 0 -0.01 -0.15
[0.17] [0.15] [0.17]
EDE * Colony y/n -0.57 -0.56 -0.41
[0.19]** [0.18]** [0.20]*
Proximity to UK -0.93 -0.86 -0.77
[0.35]** [0.32]** [0.36]*
Proximity to UK * 1.63 1.3 2.47
Colony y/n [0.97] [1.03] [1.52]
Proximity to France 1.46 1.54 0.67
[0.36]** [0.36]** [0.75]
Proximity to France* -2.18 -2.4 -0.53
Colony y/n [0.84]* [0.88]** [1.42]
Joint Wald Test: Direct Effect of Endowments on Income Equal to 0 (combining first- and second-stage effect)
P  Value: 0.1903 0.280 0.0000 0.1475 0.289 0.0000   0.4388 0.052 0.3736
Anderson Canonical Correlation LR Statistic (identification/IV relevance test all instrument)
P Value: 0.0002 0.0015 0.0001 0.0003 0.0011 0.0001  0.0238  0.0166 0.0028
Hansen J Test of Overidentication (all Instruments)
P Value: 0.1341 - 0.5297 0.2656 - 0.3133 0.3615 - 0.4385
O b s e r v a t i o n s 1 5 11 5 11 4 51 5 11 5 11 4 51 5 11 5 11 4 5
No. Of Colonies 100 100 99 93 93 93 92 92 92
R-sq first stage 0.262 0.264 0.195 0.259 0.271 0.198 0.209 0.242 0.148
Model Information and Hypothesis Tests
Panel B: Second Stage Results - Dependent Variable is the Ln of GDP per Capita in 2003
Panel A: First Stage Results - Dependent Variable is the 96-04 Avg. of "Rule of Law"
Table 9 - Robustness Analysis: Alternative Definitions for the Colony Dummy
(1) - (3) "Wide" Definition
of Former Colony
(4) - (6) "Narrow" Definition
of Former Colony
(7) - (9) Defining LBR, ETH, KOR as 
Non-Colonies
Notes: Table 9 displays two stage least square results for alternative definitions of  former colonies. Panel A presents the first-stage estimations relating endowments and colonial history to 
institutional outcomes and Panel B the second-stage estimations relating institutional outcomes and endowments to income per capita . In Columns 1 to 3, the colony dummy is equal to one 
for all countries that have been an official colony or protectorate, were under the control of an empire-affiliated organizationsuch as the Dutch and British East Indies Companies, had the 
status of protectorate of a non-adjacent empire, lost the sovereignty over its foreign policy following a military conflict witha non-adjacent empire, or was under a League of Nations 
mandate after World War I. The colony dummy in Columns 4 to 6 is equal to one for all countries that have been an official colony, were under the control of an empire-affiliated 
organization, or had the status of protectorate of a non-adjacent empire. The colony dummy in Columns 7 to 9 is the same as the colony dummy in the main part of the paper, except that 
Ethiopia, Liberia, and South Korea are counted as non-colonies. Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors are reported in parentheses; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%.
46  Figure 1 - Rainfall and Institutions in Former Colonies and Non-Colonized Countries
Notes: The upper plot of Figure 1 presents the relation between the log of average annual rainfall and the 1996 to 2004 average of the score 
for the "rule of Law" for former colonies. The lower plot of Figure 1 presents the same relation for countries that have not been colonized. 
In each plot, the solid line is the prediction of a simple OLS regression. Average annual rainfall is from Parker (1997). The score for the 
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Rainfall and Institutions in non-Colonies
































































































































7.5 8 8.5 9 9.5 10 10.5 11
Log(Distance from Europe)
Market Access and Institutions in Former Colonies
Notes: The upper plot of Figure  3 presents the relation between the logarithm of the average distance from France, the UK, and Spain and 
institutional outcomes for countries that have not been colonized. The lower plot of Figure  3 presents the same relation for former colonies. In 
each plot, the solid line is the prediction of a simple OLS regression line. The measure of institutional quality is the 1996 to 2004 average score of 
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Log (Avg. Elevation)
Elevation and Institutions in non-Colonies
Notes: The upper plot of Figure 3 presents the relation between the log of average elevation and the 1996 to 2004 average of the score for 
the "rule of Law" for former colonies. The lower plot of Figure  3 presents the same relation for countries that have not been colonized. In 
each plot, the solid line is the prediction of a simple OLS regression. Average elevation is from Parker (1997). The score for the rule of law  49  Figure 4 - Location and Colonizer Identity
Notes: The upper scatter plot of Figure 4 presents the relation between the relative distance from France and a British colony dummy. 
Relative distance from France is equal to the logarithm of the country’s distance from France minus the logarithm of the country’s distance 
from Britain. The lower scatter plot presents the relation between the absolute distance from France and Britain and a British colony 
dummy. Absolute distance from France and Britain is equal to the logarithm of the sum of the distances from France and Britain. The 
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Colony of UK (1= Yes)
Absolute Difference From Europe and Colonizer Origin
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